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ECURITIES regulation deals primarily with the laws preventing
and providing remedies for fraud in the sale of stocks and bonds.
Although this Article includes Fifth Circuit cases under federal law,
the author has attempted to limit the material to that involving state law,
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and only briefly touch federal securities law when necessary. The author
does not intend this Article to exhaust all aspects of securities regulation
but rather to update the Texas-based securities practitioner with new de-
velopments of interest.
I. COVERAGE OF THE SECURITIES ACTS
Preemption of state law by federal law narrows the scope of state law.
The Fifth Circuit twice confronted lawsuits brought in the Enron Corpo-
ration (Enron) litigation under both the Texas Securities Act (TSA) and
what is referred to here as the Texas Stock Fraud Act (TSFA),1 both of
which were deviously crafted to avoid preemption by the Securities Liti-
gation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA). 2 The importance of
these scope questions is that both TSA and TSFA provide for aider and
abetter liability not permitted under federal securities laws unless
brought by the SEC.3 TSFA also allows for punitive damages not permit-
ted under federal securities laws. 4
The Fifth Circuit found that SLUSA barred several state securities law
actions, operated in cookie-cutter fashion by one law firm, after consoli-
dation in federal court. In contrast, the Fifth Circuit found potential ac-
tions, not yet operated in cookie-cutter fashion or consolidated in state
court, as not yet preempted by SLUSA.
A. FEDERAL PREEMPTION DETERMINED AFTER CONSOLIDATION
The Enron lawsuits arose from the actions of Enron, a seller of natural
gas products. 5 During the late 1990s, Enron falsely inflated its income
and concealed losses in its securities reports, causing a "meteoric rise" in
Enron's stock price and allowing insiders to reap windfall profits. The
subsequent corrective statements made in late 2001, caused Enron's stock
price to fall precipitously and led to the bankruptcy of Enron and the
indictment of many of its senior officers. 6 A single law firm, representing
hundreds of former Enron investors, brought both lawsuits involving
preemption.
1. Texas has two major statutes to combat securities fraud: The Texas Securities Act
and the Texas Stock Fraud Act. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-1 (Vernon Supp.
2008); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 2008). TSFA is included in a statute
that also covers real estate fraud, so many of the cases dealing with TSFA's statutory fraud
deal with real estate. See § 27.01.
2. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b), (d), 78bb(f) (2006); Securities Uniform Standards Act of
1998, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006).
3. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(F)(2); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 27.01(d); Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 176-78
(1994) (no private action for aiding and abetting under Federal Rule 10b-5).
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (Exchange Act damages limited to actual damages); TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(c), (d) (punitive damages against the primary perpetra-
tor and punitive damages against the aider and abetter); see also Stone v. Kirk, 8 F.3d 1079,
1093 (6th Cir. 1993) (punitive damages unavailable under Rule 10b-5).
5. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 535 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir.
2008).
6. Id. at 331-32.
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In the first of these lawsuits, the law firm filed ten cases on behalf of
former Enron investors, in several different state courts and one federal
court, alleging securities fraud only under Texas law, including the TSA
and the TSFA, against former management of Enron, members of En-
ron's former accounting firm, and certain financial institutions, but not
Enron itself.7 Each case claimed damages for fewer than fifty investors,
not denominated a class, in an attempt to avoid preemption by SLUSA.8
In order to preserve the strict requirements on pleading under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 9 SLUSA bars most
class actions by private individuals for securities fraud based on state
law.' 0 Class actions under SLUSA include those with more than fifty in-
vestors." The defendants removed the state court actions to federal
court as relating to bankruptcy.' 2 Those actions not in the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas were transferred to the Southern District under federal stat-
utes and consolidated with the cases already in the Southern District.
The plaintiff investors in the ten cases thereafter acted in unison, using
the same attorneys, alleging nearly identical state law claims, jointly
scheduling discovery, filing joint motions, providing nearly identical dis-
covery responses, identifying the same experts, and relying on the same
expert reports. The district court dismissed the consolidated lawsuit as
preempted by SLUSA.13 The Fifth Circuit affirmed.' 4
The key issue dealt with the timing of the application of preemption
mandated by SLUSA.15 The law firm contended that the federal court
should use the time of removal from state court to determine preemption,
when each case involved less than fifty investors, rather than some time
after consolidation in federal court, when the consolidated cases involved
considerably more than fifty investors. 16 SLUSA preempts private state
securities fraud actions for "covered class action[s]" where
(1) the suits are "pending in the same court," (2) the suits involve
"common questions of law or fact," (3) "damages are sought on be-
half of more than 50 persons," and (4) the lawsuits are joined, con-
solidated, or otherwise proceed as a single action for any purpose.1 7
The law firm focused on the first and last requirements. The law firm
claimed the provision in SLUSA, which ensures the act does not interfere
with a state court's discretion whether to consolidate cases, means that
the covered class actions have to be pending in a state court.' 8 The Fifth
7. Id. at 330-31, 333.
8. Id. at 332.
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(3) (2006).
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (2006).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii).
12. In re Enron, 535 F.3d at 333.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 331.
15. Id. at 333.
16. Id. at 336.
17. Id. at 339 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B) (ii) (2006)).
18. Id. at 392 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(F)).
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Circuit rejected this idea as contrary to the plain meaning rule. 19 The
requirement had no language limiting the court to a state court.20 With
respect to the last requirement, the law firm claimed that if the preemp-
tion occurred after consolidation, the federal court could manufacture its
own preemption. 2 1 The Fifth Circuit avoided this interpretation by focus-
ing on proceedings rather than consolidation. 22 The law firm had con-
ducted the proceedings jointly, thereby causing the preemption itself.23
The Fifth Circuit also noted that the Supreme Court had recognized that
a court can determine SLUSA preemption at the time of the motion to
dismiss, a time subsequent to consolidation.
24
B. ABILITY TO AVOID PREEMPTION PRESERVED
The second lawsuit2 5 involved the law firm's misunderstanding 26 of an
injunction entered by the federal district court to curtail the law firm's
devious practices. The district court entered the injunction to prevent the
law firm from obtaining ex parte temporary restraining orders in state
court against the defendants' destruction of documents at a time when
the federal district court had already entered such restraining orders
against the same defendants, who at the time were opposed in federal
court by the law firm. The Fifth Circuit upheld the injunction, which en-
joined the law firm from filing any new Enron-related actions without
leave of the federal district court, regarding the behavior of the law firm
as an unjustified attempt to harass parties to a federal case. 27 Three days
short of four years after the disclosure of Enron's fraudulent securities
reports, the law firm moved for leave to file thirty-four state actions on
behalf of twelve hundred clients.28 Since the bankruptcy proceedings
against Enron had ended, the defendants could not remove these new
state actions to federal court under the guise of a federal cause of action
as they had done before. 29 Therefore, these lawsuits might not be consol-
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 348.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See id. (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71,
87-89 (2006)).
25. Newby v. Enron Corp. (IV), 542 F.3d 463, 467, 471 (5th Cir. 2008). Newby v.
Enron Corp. (III), 394 F.3d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 2004), dealt with a partial settlement.
26. The Fifth Circuit does not think highly of the law firm, describing their perform-
ance as "less than exemplary." See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 535
F.3d 325, 332 (5th Cir. 2008).
27. Newby (IV), 542 F.3d at 467; Newby v. Enron Corp. (I), 302 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir.
2002), cert. denied 537 U.S. 1191 (2003); see also Newby v. Enron Corp. (II), 338 F.3d 467,
475 (5th Cir. 2003) (upholding another injunction against the same law firm as an attempt
to taunt the parties and undermine the district court's ability to control the consolidated
cases).
28. Newby (IV), 542 F.3d at 467.
29. See In re Enron, 535 F.3d at 332, 335 (stating that Enron's debtors' plan was effec-
tive on November 17, 2004, and determining that a federal court is not divested of removed
actions upon termination of the bankruptcy proceedings).
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idated, might not involve more than fifty investors seeking damages each,
and so might not be preempted by SLUSA. By the time the law firm
made the motion, the three year statute of limitations had run for TSA
violations, 30 but not the four-year statute of limitations for TSFA.31 The
district court denied the motion because under its local court rules it
would take twenty days before the court could render a decision. By that
time, all the limitations periods would have elapsed.32 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed with respect to the three-year limitations period, but reversed
and remanded with respect to the four-year limitations period.
33
Dispensing with tolling arguments that would have allowed all the law-
suits to proceed, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a Texas court might
deem a late state filing as dating back to the filing of the motion for leave
to file, thereby allowing the lawsuits subject to a four-year limitations pe-
riod to proceed.3 4 The federal district court should not have prevented
the Texas court from ruling on the matter.35 With respect to preemption,
the Fifth Circuit preserved the ability of the plaintiffs' bar to shape their
lawsuits so as to avoid SLUSA preemption. 36 The defendants claimed
that SLUSA would preempt even the lawsuits subject to the four-year
limitations period. The Fifth Circuit disagreed. 37 Congress intended to
permit bona fide individual actions, even if more than fifty persons
brought separate actions in the same court against the same defendant. 38
It is only when the lawsuits are "joined, consolidated, or otherwise pro-
ceed as a single action" that SLUSA preempts them.39 There was no
indication that Texas courts would consolidate the actions. Notions of
federalism dictate that Texas courts should decide how to proceed with
their own multiple actions, not the federal courts.
II. ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE SECURITIES BOARD
TSA created a regulatory body, the State Securities Board (Board), to
handle the registrations required by TSA as well as to serve as an en-
30. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(H) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
31. Newby (IV), 542 F.3d at 468; TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN § 16.004
(Vernon Supp. 2008) (statute of limitations for fraud).
32. Newby (IV), 542 F.3d at 463.
33. Id. at 474.
34. See id. at 470-72. The 2002 injunction did not toll the limitations period since it
merely required an additional step, the motion for leave to file, to the filing in state court.
Id. at 471. The 2002 scheduling order did not toll the limitations period since it only ap-
plied to amending and responsive filings. Id. The tolling doctrine of American Pipe &
Construction v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 552-53 (1974), where the filing of a class action tolls the
statute of limitations for all purported members of the class to prevent numerous protec-
tive motions to intervene or join in the event the court denied class certification, did not
apply since Texas courts have refused to adopt the doctrine for federal class actions. See
Bell v. Showa Denko K.K., 899 S.W.2d 749, 757-58 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, writ
denied).
35. Newby (IV), 542 F.3d at 470.
36. Id. at 474.
37. Id. at 473-74.
38. Id. at 474.
39. Id. at 473 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii) (II) (2006)).
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forcement mechanism. 40 The Board updated its form for requesting open
records by referring to "public information" rather than "open records,"
and by denoting the Attorney General's authority over the charges for
copies.
4 1
III. REGISTRATION OF SECURITIES
The basic rule of most securities laws is that securities must be regis-
tered with the regulatory agency unless they fall within an exemption to
registration. Enforcement actions generally focus on issuers failing to
register their securities and making misleading statements to aid the sale.
The Board adopted a new revised chapter concerning its registration
guidelines for real estate programs operated in the form of limited part-
nerships to bring them in line with those adopted by the North American
Securities Administrators Association, Inc. (NASAA). 42 NASAA in-
tends to have many states adopt their guidelines to achieve national uni-
formity in forms as well as consistency in standards to facilitate
nationwide registration.43 The Board also amended its securities registra-
tion application to eliminate a corporate applicant's certification of
franchise tax payments since Texas no longer requires certification to ob-
tain permits or licenses.44
Board enforcement actions against issuers dealt with failure to register
securities and selling agents,45 and some with additional misrepresenta-
tions by omitting judgments against the principals, 46 projecting future val-
40. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-1 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
41. 33 Tex. Reg. 8991, adopted 33 Tex. Reg. 1320 (2008) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 133.1) (adopting new form and repealing old form without comment).
42. See 33 Tex. Reg. 1919-20, adopted 33 Tex. Reg. 7154 (2008) (codified at 7 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE §§ 117.1-.9) (adopting new chapter without comment); 33 Tex. Reg. 1919,
adopted 33 Tex. Reg. 7153 (repealing former chapter). The changes to the chapter also
required changes to a form. 33 Tex. Reg. 1939, adopted 33 Tex. Reg. 7154 (2008) (codified
at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 117.1-.9 (adopting new form and repealing old form without
comment).
43. See NASSA.org, Statement of Policy Regarding Real Estate Programs, http://www.
nassa.org/content/FilesRealEstate-Programs.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2008) ("standards
are primarily designed for public real estate syndications ... which make or invest in [real
estate] mortgage[s]").
44. See 33 Tex. Reg. 8992, adopted 37 Tex. 1321 (2008) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 133.7) (adopting without comment); 32 Tex. Reg. 8992 (2007), adopted 33 Tex.
Reg. 1321 (2008). The Texas legislature made the statutory change in 2001. Act of June 15,
2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1158, § 94, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 2570, 2615 (Vernon Supp. 2001)
(repealing TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.45, which prohibited obtaining a permit or
license from any state action if the corporation was delinquent in its franchise tax pay-
ments). See also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 56 SMU LAW REV. 1995,
2009-11 (2003) (discussing the statutory change and its impact on other Board rules).
45. See In re D'Log Mining, Inc., No. ENF-08-CDO-1655, 2008 WL 2412066 (Tex. St.
Sec. Bd. May 28, 2008) (agreed cease and desist order for selling gold certificates redeem-
able in the future for gold or the then price of gold and equity agreement contracts for 5%
of the net income generated from mining an Alaskan lease); In re BioDefense Corp., No.
ENF-08-CDO-1651, 2008 WL 916881 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 28, 2008) (agreed cease and
desist order for selling stock).
46. See In re TierOne Converged Networks, Inc., No. ENF-08-CDO-1654, 2008 WL
2158815 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 19, 2008) (emergency cease and desist order for the sale of
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ues,47 and omitting information on the promoter's prior investment
programs.4 8 Many involved the Board's identification of threats to inves-
convertible preferred stock omitting two arbitration awards for $0.4 million, an order of
the FIRA for payment of $0.5 million in restitution to twenty-three individuals, and a
bankruptcy filling to cancel $0.9 million in potential arbitration awards, all for securities
fraud committed by the issuer's principal); In re TPR-Tex. Petroleum Res., Inc., No. ENF-
08-CDO-1648, 2008 WL 697627 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 5, 2008) (emergency cease and
desist order for the sale of working interests in Texas oil and gas wells because of misrepre-
sented validity of promoter modifications to subscription agreements contrary to state-
ments made in the offering materials, ownership of a Railroad Commission operator
number, several omitted Texas judgments against the issuer, and a Wisconsin order prohib-
iting the issuer and agent from selling the securities in Wisconsin); In re Provident Capital
Indem., Ltd, No. ENF-08-CDO-1647, 2008 WL 283769, at *2-3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Jan. 17,
2008) (emergency cease and desist order for the sale of bonded life contracts [line of credit
promissory notes] with 15% per annum return because omitted a conviction to commit
mail and wire fraud, a Florida receivership, a Texas Department of Insurance cease and
desist order, and information on the promoters, issuer's operating history, and issuer's
financials); In re Bramlett, No. ENF-07-CDO-1644, 2007 WL 4285304, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec.
Bd. Dec. 3, 2007) (emergency cease and desist order against the sale of interests in a night-
club because omitted a conviction for mail fraud resulting in 121 months of incarceration
and an order to pay restitution of $8 million).
47. See In re Kensington Res., Inc., No. ENIF-08-CDO-1662, 2008 WL 4686379, at *1-2
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Oct. 15, 2008) (emergency cease and desist order against sale of common
stock of environmental company because represented orally a six-fold increase in value
upon a financial audit and airing of television documentary).
48. See In re Crescent Dev., LLC, No. ENF-08-CDO-1646, 2008 WL 166481, at *2-3
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Jan. 15, 2008) (emergency cease and desist order for selling oil and gas
interests because of omitted information on the promoter's background, operating history,
an offer to transfer prior drilling program to another, failure to drill in another drilling
program due to rig unavailability, failure to tender funds for a rescission on another drill-
ing program, and operator charter forfeitures in prior drilling programs).
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tors,49 namely oil and gas scams, 50 ponzi schemes, 51 internet fraud,52 and
high-yield notes.53
IV. REGISTRATION OF MARKET OPERATORS
One of the underpinnings of state regulation of securities is the re-
quirement to register as a seller of securities before selling securities in
the state, and as an investment advisor before rendering investment ad-
vice.54 Registration infractions generally surface when applying or reapp-
lying for registration.
For fraudulent selling schemes aimed at certain demographic groups,
the Board adopted a new rule based on NASAA's model, pursuant to "a
multi-state effort to focus national attention on unscrupulous practices
49. See, e.g., Press Release, Tex. State Sec. Bd., Securities Commissioner Identifies Top
10 Threats to Texas Investors Governor Perry Proclaims, "April Savings and Investing
Month" (Apr. 6, 2005) (major threats are Ponzi schemes, unlicensed securities sellers, un-
registered investment products, promissory notes issued by those unable to deliver prom-
ised returns, fraudulent or unsuitable opportunities targeted toward certain demographic
groups, high-yield investments, internet fraud, variable annuity sales practices, and oil and
gas scams).
50. See In re Rockwall Oil Co., ENF-08-CDO-1663, 2008 WL 4829382, at *1 (Tex. St.
Sec. Bd. Oct. 15, 2008) (emergency cease and desist order for selling oil and gas interests
because omitted promoter's use of investor funds from numerous previous drillings for
personal expenses); In re Whitt Oil & Gas, Inc., No. ENF-08-CDO/FIN-1659, 2008 WL
4118161, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd., Aug. 29, 2008) (agreed cease and desist order and order
assessing administrative fine of $3,000 for selling working interests in Louisiana oil and gas
prospect); In re Cottonwood Petroleum Co., No. ENF-08-CDO-1656, 2008 WL 2646582
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd., June 27, 2008) (agreed cease and desist order for selling working inter-
ests in Texas oil and gas prospect); In re Exodus Exploration, LLC, No. ENF-08-CDO-
1652, 2008 WL 2102448 (Tex. St. Sec. ld. May 8, 2008) (agreed cease and desist order for
selling working interests in Louisiana oil and gas prospect); In re GNG Operating Co., No.
ENF-08-CDO-1653, 2008 WL 2102450 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 8, 2008) (agreed cease and
desist order for selling working interests in Texas oil and gas prospect through newspaper
ads); In re Sema Oil & Gas Inc., No. ENF-08-CDO-1645, 2008 WL 166480, at *1 (Tex. St.
Sec. Bd. Jan. 3, 2008) (agreed cease and desist order for offering interests in oil and gas
lease through newspaper ads).
51. See In re Nat'l Funding Alliance, LLC, No. ENF-08-CDO-1657, 2008 WL 2646585
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. July 2, 2008) (emergency cease and desist order for selling interests in a
program to leverage investment and trade with a return equal to the investment within one
month for three months, and then a guaranteed monthly return of more than five times the
investment amount, because omitted an indication of assets to satisfy guarantee, the iden-
tity of the trader, profitability of other investment opportunities sold, and any risks); In re
Painted Horse, LLC, No. ENF-08-CDO-1650, 2008 WL 916880 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 28,
2008) (agreed cease and desist order for selling equity interests in a company seeking to
develop North Dakota oil leases with annual return of 20% through newspaper ads).
52. See In re Fabulair, LLC, No. ENF-07-CDO-1643, 2007 WL 4219607, at *1 (Tex. St.
Sec. Bd. Nov. 20, 2007) (agreed cease and desist order for internet offering of interests in
limited liability company website).
53. See In re Secure Growth LLC, No. ENF-08-CDO-1661, 2008 WL 4295075, at *1
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 11, 2008) (agreed cease and desist order for sale of bonded life
contracts [line of credit promissory notes] with 15% per annum return); In re Rodney Int'l,
No. ENF-08-CDO-1649, 2008 WL 916879 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 28, 2008) (emergency
cease and desist order for sale of debt product secured by real estate assets of the issuer
returning 14.25% to 24% on annual basis because misrepresented a Canadian certificate to
sell securities, omitted compliance with TSA for referral fees, and numerous Ontario court
actions for attempting to sell watches with forged registered trademarks).
54. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-13(A)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
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targeting senior [citizens]. '' 55 The rule prohibits the use of designations
implying that the registered dealer or registered investment advisor had
special training in providing brokerage services to senior citizens or retir-
ees, provides a means for recognition of an accredited certifying organiza-
tion, and places registered dealers and registered investment advisors on
notice that use of misleading designations is administratively actionable. 56
The Board updated its definitional rule and its dealer and investment
advisor rules to reflect the formation of the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FIRA) from "the merger of the [National Association of Se-
curities Dealers (NASD)] and the member regulation, enforcement, and
arbitration functions of the New York Stock Exchange. '' 57 The Board
also repealed as outdated two dealer forms concerning minimum book-
keeping records for dealers and the memorandum to securities dealers.58
A. DEALERS
The Board brought several enforcement actions against dealers and
selling agents. Dealer infractions included expulsion from self-regula-
tory organizations,59 failing to maintain adequate systems to prevent
sales of unregistered securities, 60 failing to follow written supervi-
sory procedures, 61 and failing to provide the Board with requested
55. 33 Tex. Reg. 8761 (2008) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 115.16).
56. For dealers, 33 Tex. Reg. 6679, adopted 33 Tex. Reg. 8761 (2008) (codified at 7
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 115.16) (adopting new rule without comment). For investment advi-
sors, see 33 Tex. Reg. 6631, adopted 33 Tex. Reg. 8762 (2008) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 116.16) (adopting new rule without comment).
57. For the definitional rule, see 33 Tex. Reg. 7813, adopted 33 Tex. Reg. 1319 (2008)
(codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 107.2 adopted 33 Tex. Reg. 7813, (adopting amendment
to rules in that comment). For the update of dealer rules, see 33 Tex. Reg. 7814, adopted 33
Tex. Reg. 1310 (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 115.1-115.5) (adopting amendment to
rules without comment). For the update of investment advisor rules, see 33 Tex. Reg. 8815,
adopted 33 Tex. Reg. 1319 (2008) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 116.2-116.3) (adopt-
ing amendment to rules without comment).
58. For the form concerning minimum bookkeeping records for dealers, see 33 Tex.
Reg. 6682, adopted 33 Tex. Reg. 8762 (2008) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 133.21)
(adopted without comment). For the form concerning the memorandum to securities deal-
ers, see 33 Tex. Reg. 6682, adopted 33 Tex. Reg. 8762 (2008) (codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 133.22) (adopted without comment).
59. See In re Dealer Registration of Costa Fin. Sec., Inc., No. IC08-REV-10, 2008 WL
3895879, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 14, 2008) (default order revoking registration of
dealer expelled from a self-regulatory organization for violating NASD rules that required
provision of information and documents related to an enforcement action with respect to
private placement offerings).
60. See In re Dealer Registration of Morgan Stanley & Co., No. IC08-CDO-15, 2008
WL 4544454, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Oct. 2, 2008) (consent order and administrative fine
of $448,055, Texas's share of state settlement of $8.5 million in NASAA investigation, for
merger predecessor's absence of a surveillance system to check for possible Blue Sky Law
violations for most fixed income securities, and for failure to the correct system when auto-
mated and after merger for more than eight years).
61. See In re Dealer Registration of SWS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. IC08-CAF-12, 2008 WL
4371758, at *1-3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 22, 2008) (disciplinary order reprimanding and
assessing administrative fine of $35,000 for failure to submit branch office's advertising,
conducting investment seminars for seniors without approval as required by written super-
visory procedures, and failure to have supervisory procedures requiring submission of busi-




Selling agent violations involved selling unregistered securities while
not registered as a dealer or agent,63 failing to comply with a prior agreed
undertaking with the Board,64 violating the dealer's supervisory proce-
dures,65 using the name of an unaffiliated dealer in advertisements,66 and
No. IC08-CAF-07, 2008 WL 2898321 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. July 21, 2008) (disciplinary order
reprimanding and assessing administrative fine of $400,000 for branch manager's failure to
follow supervisory procedures for agent's outside business information and to receive com-
pliance department approval for agent's outside business, review of incoming letters re-
questing client money withdrawals, determination of purpose for large client withdrawals,
and acceptance of three wire transfers).
62. See In re Dealer Registration of Solomon Advisors, Inc., No. IC07-SUS-29, 2007
WL 4623026, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec. 20, 2007) (disciplinary order suspending dealer
for two years for telling Board of document destruction for two client arbitrations but then
later producing them to avoid violation of dealer's duties).
63. See In re Perales, No. ENF-08-CDO/FIN-1660, 2008 WL 4118162, at *1-2 (Tex. St.
Sec. Bd. Aug. 29, 2008) (agreed cease and desist order and order assessing administrative
fine of $3,000 against the agent for selling working interests in Louisiana oil and gas pros-
pect); In re First Diversified Fin. Servs., Inc., No. ENF-08-CDO-1658, 2008 WL 4118158, at
*1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd., Aug. 27, 2008) (agreed cease and desist order for sale of Class A 8%
Preferred Member Limited Liability Company Interests); In re Agent Registration of John
David Butler, No. IC08-SUS-04, 2008 WL 2102451 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 9, 2008) (discipli-
nary order granting registration, reprimanding and suspending agent for three days, and
assessing administrative fine of $10,000 for selling oil and gas interests while employed by
oil companies).
64. See In re Agent Registration of John Michael Curran, No. IC08-SUS-11, 2008 WL
3997368, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 25, 2008) (disciplinary order reprimanding and
suspending the agent for seven days, and assessing an administrative fine of $17,500 for
agent acting in a supervisory capacity contrary to the 2004 undertaking); In re Agent Re-
gistration of John Edward Shryack, No. IC08-SUS-06, 2008 WL 2898320 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd.
July 17, 2008) (disciplinary order approving application and suspending the agent for five
days for acting in a supervisory capacity contrary to the 1997 undertaking); In re Applica-
tions for the Agent and Inv. Adviser Representative Registrations of Patricia Ann Shearer,
No. IC07-SUS-28, 2007 WL 4472937, at *1-3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec. 10, 2007) (disciplinary
order granting the applications, and reprimanding and suspending the agent for thirty days
for failing to supervise as required in the 2004 undertaking).
65. See In re Agent and Inv. Adviser Representative Registrations of Stanley Earnest
Pyndus, Jr., No. IC08-SUS-09, 2008 WL 3827419, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 12, 2008)
(disciplinary order suspending agent for six months for selling limited partnership interests
in outside business activity when approved only for advisory position and barred from
selling investment not approved by dealer's supervisory procedures); In re Agent Registra-
tion of Philip Douglas Gundy, No. IC08-CAF-05, 2008 WL 2789737 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. July
14, 2008) (disciplinary order reprimanding and assessing administrative fine of $5,000 for
permitting client's spouse to withdraw $30,000 without having an approved executed power
of attorney or trading authorization documents on file as required by the dealer's written
supervisory procedures).
66. See In re Applications for the Inv. Adviser Registration of Select Asset Mgmt.,
LLC, No. IC08-CAF-08, 2008 WL 2954055 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. July 23, 2008) (disciplinary
order granting the application, reprimanding, and assessing administrative fine of $7,500
for rendering investment advice when not registered and using the name of an unaffiliated
registered dealer in advertising materials); In re Agent Registration of Martin Dean White,
Sr., No. IC07-SUS-26, 2007 WL 4303792, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec. 5, 2007) (discipli-
nary order suspending agent for three years for mailings in connection with a private place-
ment using the name of another dealer without authorization); In re Agent Registration of
Craig Alan Jansen, No. IC07-SUS-25, 2007 WL 4219611, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Nov. 20,
2007) (same); In re Dealer Registration of M & W Fin., Inc., No. IC07-CEN-24, 2007 WL
4219608, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Nov. 20, 2007) (disciplinary order reprimanding and
assessing administrative fine of $65,000 for failure to supervise agents who made mislead-
ing mailings and for failure to have supervisory procedures requiring approval of mailings).
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failing to disclose to the Board a tax lien filed against an agent. 67
B. INVESTMENT ADVISERS
The Board's enforcement actions against investment advisers involved
situations when advisers rendered compensated service without registra-
tion,68 failed to comply with an agreed undertaking with the Board,69
failed to establish a written supervisory policy to prevent advice from be-
ing given by unregistered investment advisor representatives, 70 failed to
disclose to the Board outside businesses and used testimonials in adver-
tising,71 failed to disclose to investors personal use of issuer funds and
various misrepresentations made to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC),'72 represented to the Board that corrective actions would
be taken but failed to take them,73 and failed to amend filings to reflect
current business addresses.7 4
67. See In re Application for Agent Registration of Sydney Barrett, No. IC08-DOR-
02, 2008 WL 837053 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 21, 2008) (default order denying application for
failure to disclose tax lien filed against agent and other business engaged in by agent, and
for selling securities after revocation of registration).
68. See In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Alex Francis Weisberg, Jr., No. IC08-CEN-
16, 2008 WL 4615719 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Oct. 14, 2008) (granting application while repri-
manding for rendering service after registration expired in 2002).
69. See In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Gamboa Capital Mgmt, Inc., No. IC07-SUS-
27, 2007 WL 4472938, at *2-3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec. 10, 2007) (disciplinary order repri-
manding and suspending adviser for ten days, and assessing administrative fines on adviser
and advisor's representative of $5,000 each for failing to have independent consultant re-
view compliance as provided in 2005 undertaking).
70. See In re Matihew B. Burnham, No. IC08-CDO-13, 2008 WL 4452452 (Tex. St. Sec.
Bd. Sept. 30, 2008) (disciplinary order reprimanding and assessing administrative fine of
$22,500 for lack of procedures for supervision of investment representatives, one of whom
rendered services without registration, along with cease and desist order against represen-
tative and administrative fine of $7,500).
71. See In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Int'l Wealth Mgmt., Inc., No. IC08-CAF-03,
2008 WL 2231792, at *2-3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 7, 2008) (disciplinary order reprimanding
and assessing administrative fines of $5,000 each on the investment adviser and the invest-
ment adviser's representative for using testimonials in advertising and for failure to dis-
close representative's ownership in real estate, trucking, and insurance businesses).
72. See In re Application for Inv. Adviser Registration of David Henry Disraeli, No.
IC08-DOR-01, 2008 WL 484272, at *7-9 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Feb. 14, 2008) (application de-
nied for failing to disclose to investors the promoter's tax lien, use of issuer funds for the
promoter's personal expenses, and an issuer loan to promoter, and for misrepresenting to
the SEC that the issuer was a newly formed adviser when he was not, that the promoter
was required to register in thirty or more states when he was not, and that the promoter
would be eligible for registration with the SEC when he had no reasonable belief of such
occurring).
73. See In re Inv. Advisor Registration of Joseph Andrew Acciarito, No. IC08-SUS-14,
2008 WL 4452453, at *1-3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 30, 2008) (disciplinary order reprimand-
ing and suspending registration for forty-five days, and assessing an administrative fine of
$10,000 for failure to maintain a general ledger and income statement, erroneous claims of
certified financial planner designation on Form ADV and letterhead, and for failure to
correct such shortcomings after the first inspection as agreed).
74. See In re Inv. Adviser Registration of Mederick L. Shaw, No. IC07-SUS-23, 2007
WL 3514355, at *2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Nov. 8, 2007) (disciplinary order reprimanding and




One of the major reasons legislatures passed securities acts was to facil-
itate investors' actions to recover their moneys through a simplified fraud
action that removed the most difficult elements to prove in common-law
fraud, namely scienter and privity.7 5
A. COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE TEXAS ACTS
Two Texas courts of appeal confirmed two unrelated matters that their
sister courts had confronted in earlier years. To sustain a criminal convic-
tion for securities fraud, one Texas court of appeals determined that a
jury need not be unanimous in agreeing which of several misstatements
and omissions constituted the fraudulent act.76 With respect to civil lia-
bility for securities fraud, another Texas court of appeals concluded that,
despite language in TSA voiding contracts in violation of the act, an is-
suer could not void a sales contract to sell unregistered securities since its
own actions caused the lack of registration. 77
Federal courts, through their diversity and removal jurisdiction, also
deal with securities fraud lawsuits brought under the Texas acts. Their
opinions under TSA and TSFA have raised two issues of interest. First,
the Fifth Circuit confirmed that federal courts apply the federal pleading
rules to complaints under the Texas acts, requiring specific allegations on
the misstatements, identification of the perpetrators, circumstances of the
misstatements, and the motives for the misstatements. 78 Consequently,
an investor pleading that lacked specific identification of material misrep-
resentations and/or omissions required repleading. 79 Second, although
the Texas acts provide for aider and abetter liability, the Texas acts are
difficult to apply to transactions in the secondary market. The investors
need to replead under TSA to comply with the privity requirement with
the primary perpetrator, which is unlikely in the secondary market, and
under TSFA to reveal a duty to disclose something omitted by the aider
and abetter, which is also unlikely in the secondary market.
1. Criminal Jury Unanimity Not Required for Multiple Misstatements
and Omissions
Perpetrators of securities fraud generally make more than one mis-
statement or omission. The Texas constitution requires a unanimous jury
verdict for a felony conviction. 80 The issue for a criminal conviction for
securities fraud is whether each member of the jury must agree on the
75. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art. 581-4(f) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
76. See Bridwell v. State, Nos. 05-07-00258-CR, 05-07-00259-CR, 2008 WL 467271, at
*4, *6 (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 23, 2008, no pet.) (not yet released for publication and so
subject to revision or withdrawal).
77. Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int'l, Inc. v. Smith, 243 S.W.3d 776, 779, 782 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
78. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338-39 (5th Cir. 2008).
79. Id. at 341.
80. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 13.
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same misstatement or omission, or different jurors may base their guilty
verdict on different misstatements or omissions made in the same trans-
action.81 In Bridwell v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals determined
that jury members need not agree on the same misstatement or omis-
sion.8 2 The perpetrator of the fraud had offered for sale working inter-
ests in oil and gas leases pursuant to a private placement memorandum
that failed to disclose three material items, namely, his two separate con-
victions for securities fraud twenty years earlier, resulting in two prison
terms,8 3 and his settlement of a civil securities fraud action ten years ear-
lier, resulting in an agreed judgment.8 4 The jury instruction directed a
fraud finding upon the occurrence of one of the three items, listed in the
disjunctive, allowing conceivably, different jurors to find fraud based on
different omissions.8 5 Jury unanimity requires the jury to agree on the
offense, but not necessarily on the same method of committing the of-
fense, provided the legislature has proscribed an offense with multiple or
alternate modes of commission, and provided that the legislative action is
fair and rational. 86 With respect to the first proviso, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals has determined that for transitive verbs describing the
prohibited conduct, the jury must be unanimous,8 7 but for adverbial
phrases describing how the perpetrator committed the offense, the jury
need not be unanimous. 88 For criminal securities fraud under TSA, the
transitive verb is "engage," while the adverbial phrase is "in fraud," with
"fraud" defined as any misstatement or omission.8 9 Thus, TSA does not
require that jury members unanimously agree on the same misstatement
or omission. With respect to the second proviso, the due process require-
ment, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has deemed it satisfied if the
various modes of commission all "involve the same injury, to the same
complainant, during the same transaction, with a similar level of culpabil-
ity." 90 Therefore, misstatements or omissions, in the same private place-
ment memorandum, presented to one investor for one sale of a security,
81. See Bridwell, 2008 WL 467271, at *4.
82. Id. at *4, 6.
83. These two convictions also were for failure to disclose prior fraudulent transac-
tions with previous investors. See Bridwell v. State, 804 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Crim. App.
1991), affg 761 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988).
84. Bridwell, 2008 WL 467271, at *6.
85. Id. at *6-7.
86. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has set out this principle for determining the
necessity of jury unanimity for crimes committable by multiple modes. See Jefferson v.
State, 189 S.W.3d 305, 309-12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 957 (2006)
(upholding a conviction for injury to a child under a jury instruction permitting one of
three acts in the disjunctive to cause the injury, without requiring unanimity on which of
the three acts caused the injury).
87. Pizzo v. State, 235 S.W.3d 711, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
88. Id. at 715 (citing Jefferson, 189 S.W.3d at 315 (Cochran, J., concurring)).
89. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-29C(1) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (the penal
offense: "[a]ny person who shall ... engage in any fraud or fraudulent practice"); art. 581-
4(F) (definitions: "[t]he terms 'fraud' or 'fraudulent practice' shall include any ... inten-
tional failure to disclose a material fact").
90. Jefferson, 189 S.W.3d at 313.
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satisfy the due process requirement. 91 The Dallas Court of Appeals
noted that the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals has reached
the same conclusion in a similar situation.92
2. Inability of Issuer to Void Sale for Lack of Registration
TSA provides that any person performing a contract in violation of the
TSA, or who has acquired any right under such a contract with knowl-
edge of the facts making its performance in violation of TSA, may not
base any lawsuit on that contract.9 3 For example, in Anglo-Dutch Petro-
leum International, Inc. v. Smith, the issuer had sold litigation funding
agreements to investors in order to fund its dispute with a major oil field
operator concerning the development of a foreign oil field.94 When re-
covery turned out to be less than expected, the issuer attempted to rene-
gotiate the litigation funding agreements with the investors, seeking a
reduced payment. One investor refused the lesser amount and sued for
fraudulent inducement, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach
of contract. 95 The trial court awarded the investor actual damages, exem-
plary damages, and attorney's fees. The Houston Fourteenth District
Court of Appeals affirmed as modified by eliminating the exemplary
damages. 96 The issuer contended that TSA voided the litigation funding
agreements since they dealt with unregistered securities. 97 The appellate
court noted that this same issuer had urged the same argument before the
Houston First District Court of Appeals and lost.98 The court held that
the issuer of securities had no standing to bring a claim urging the
unenforceableness of the securities based on those securities being unre-
gistered.99 The issuer itself caused the unregistered status by not register-
ing them with the Board. 1° ° Although the sister court's opinion from that
case did not bind the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals, the
court had previously elected to follow it. 1° 1
91. Bridwell v. State, Nos. 05-07-00258-CR, 05-07-00259-CR, 2008 WL 467271, at *6-8
(Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 23, 2008, no pet.).
92. Id. at *7 (citing Murchison v. State, 93 S.W.3d 239, 257-59 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (criminal securities fraud conviction under disjunctive jury
instructions for five omissions to disclose to investors)).
93. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(K) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
94. Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int'l, Inc. v. Smith, 243 S.W.3d 776 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
95. Id. at 779-80.
96. Id. at 779.
97. Id. at 782.
98. Id. See Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int'l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). For a discussion of this case, see George Lee Flint,
Jr., Securities Regulation, 60 SMU LAw REV. 1293, 1300-01 (2007) (under both TSA and
federal securities laws, courts have determined that contracts to purchase securities "are
not void but voidable only at the option of the purchaser").
99. Smith, 243 S.W.3d at 782.
100. Id.
101. Id. See Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int'l, Inc. v. Littlemill Ltd., No. 14-06-00921-CV,
2007 WL 2826900, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 2, 2007, no pet.).
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3. Federal Pleading Rules Apply to TSA and TSFA in Federal Court
Federal rules of pleading fraud require specific allegations of material
misrepresentations and omissions, along with allegations of who made
the statements, where the perpetrator made the statements, when the
perpetrator made the statements, and why the perpetrator made the
statements.'0 2 For the latter scienter requirement, the Fifth Circuit re-
quires that plaintiff must "set forth specific facts supporting an inference
of fraud. ' 10 3 The Fifth Circuit had previously stated in dicta that these
pleading rules should apply to state actions brought in federal court.1 0 4
In Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc.,10 5 the Fifth Circuit made the matter
clear. The investors had purchased promissory notes through both a pri-
vate placement memorandum and subsequent solicitations from an issuer
formed to finance another company's purchases of single-family resi-
dences.10 6 The private placement memorandum indicated that the issuer
would receive mortgages in the acquired properties as security for the
financing. 10 7 When the issuer failed to make payment when the notes
became due and the investors discovered that the issuer lacked security
for the financing, they brought suit under federal and state law.10 8 The
district court dismissed both the state and federal actions for failure to
plead with the particularity required by the federal rules.10 9 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.' 10 For the subsequent solic-
itations, the pleadings failed to allege purchases made pursuant to the
solicitations and failed to identify those making the misrepresenta-
tions.' The TSFA claim failed since promissory notes are not "stock in
102. To successfully plead fraud under FED. R. Cv. P. 9(b), plaintiffs "must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge,
and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
103. See, e.g., Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1102 (5th Cir. 1994) (securities fraud
under federal law). These pleading requirements are less stringent than the requirements
for federal actions brought under the PSLRA. Under PSLRA plaintiff must "specify each
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on informa-
tion and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is
formed." See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2006). With respect to scienter, the PLSA stiffens
the requirement to a strong inference. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006) ("the complaint
shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particu-
larity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind.").
104. See Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 966 (1997) for a case involving the same misrepresentations under federal securi-
ties law and the state common law fraud action, in which the investors made no distinction
between the federal claims and state claims. In the case, the court stated, "[w]e see no
principled reason why the state claims of fraud should escape the pleading requirements of
the federal rules, and the parties have not urged a separate focus upon state law claims of
negligent misrepresentation."
105. 540 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2008).
106. Id. at 337.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 337-38.
109. Id. at 338-39.
110. Id. at 333.
111. Id. at 341 n.10.
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a corporation," as required for fraud in violation of the TSFA.1 12 The
aiding and abetting claim under the TSA failed since the investors had
not pled scienter of the aider and abetter.113 But the other claim under
the TSA, along with the common law securities fraud claim, survived.
11 4
TSA has no scienter requirement for fraud by the seller.1 1 5 With respect
to the common law claim, the Fifth Circuit found that the investor suffi-
ciently pled scienter, although only alleging that the perpetrator was an
officer of the company. Normally, such pleading does not give an infer-
ence of scienter, but the Fifth Circuit recognizes an exception for a one-
product company with few employees)'16 The issuer had only one prod-
uct, its loans to one company, and had no employees.
1 17
Federal district courts also applied the federal pleading rules to claims
brought in federal court under Texas law. In In re Enron Corp. Securities,
Derivative & ERISA Litigation,118 the district court found that the inves-
tors had not sufficiently pled the violation against the primary perpetra-
tor under the TSA because the pleadings lacked specific identifications of
material misrepresentations and omissions, as well as the where, when,
who, and why under the federal rules.119
In another TSA case, a federal district court similarly applied the fed-
eral fraud pleading rules to the real estate portion of the TSFA. In
Bilouiris v. Sundance Resources, Inc.,12 0 the federal district court consid-
ered a motion to dismiss the complaints against a company that had set
up "Rig Bank Funds" to fund the purchase of oil and gas drilling rigs.
12 1
Investors purchased units in the "Rig Bank Funds" that, in turn, lent the
money to the company to purchase rigs in return for interests in oil and
gas leases.1 22 The company's insiders "systematically" transferred the
company's assets to themselves, thereby shifting the funds acquired from
the investors to the company's insiders and driving the company into in-
solvency.' 23 The investors asserted fraud in selling these real estate inter-
ests under the real estate portion of the TSFA.' 24 The investors alleged
112. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 2008) (regarding "[f]raud in a
transaction involving ... stock in a corporation or joint stock company").
113. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F(2) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (requiring an
"intent to deceive or defraud or with reckless disregard for the truth or the law").
114. Dorsey, 540 F.3d at 344.
115. See Wood v. Combustion Eng'g Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 1981) (using the
Texas two-year statute of limitations for general fraud with scienter rather than the TSA
statute of limitations to a federal rule 10b-5 claim since the rule 10b-5 claim requires scien-
ter while TSA does not); see also Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 302 F.3d
552, 563-64 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding an exception to the TSA's no scienter requirement for
an untrue promise of future performance).
116. See Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 424-25 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding one
product with thirty-three employees).
117. Dorsey, 540 F.3d at 337.
118. 540 F. Supp. 2d 759 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
119. Id. at 797.
120. 559 F. Supp. 2d 733 (N.D. Tex. 2008).






fraud for inducing them to purchase the units, 125 as well as a violation of
the TSA for the sale of unregistered securities. 126 With respect to the
securities fraud under the statutory fraud act, the investors relied on
group allegations of fraud but failed to denote which perpetrator made
which representation. 2 7 The district court dismissed this count without
prejudice to refile. 128 With respect to the sale of unregistered securities
under the TSA, the company and its insiders urged dismissal since the
"Rig Bank Funds" were exempt from registration because they were sold
to less than thirty-five investors. 129 The district court overruled the mo-
tion to dismiss this count; since the company and its insiders neglected to
plead the matter, it could not be considered on a motion to dismiss. 130
One can but wonder, at the ultimate success of the perpetrator's argu-
ment for exemption in light of the Board's cease and desist order for not
registering these units or the agents selling them.' 31
4. Aider and Abetter Liability in the Secondary Market
When the perpetrator of fraud lacks funds to satisfy a judgment, in-
jured investors seek lucrative sources of recovery from third parties who
enabled the alleged perpetrator to sell the securities. For investors en-
gaged in the secondary market, holding these aiders and abetters liable
for their investment loss under both the TSA and TSFA involves some
difficulties. The federal system generally has two securities statutes: one
for the primary market-the Securities Act132-and one for the secon-
dary market-the Exchange Act.133 In contrast, the Texas system basi-
cally has one statute, the TSA.134 The liability provisions of the TSA,
especially for sellers, are modeled on the federal Securities Act for the
primary market. 13 5 The TSA generally treats transactions on the secon-
dary market as exempt securities, 36 leaving regulation of the secondary
125. See Biloiouris v. Sundance Res., Inc., No. 307CV01591, 2008 WL 4067653, at *29
(N.D. Tex. June 30, 2008) (trial Pleading; count 4).
126. One of the TSA violations involved violation of a cease and desist order of the
Board. See Biloiouris, 2008 WL 4067653, at *31 (trial Pleading; count 11). The Board
issued its order to stop the sale of working interests in oil and gas drilling projects without
registering the securities and the selling agents. See In re Sundance Res., Inc., No. ENG-
06-CDO-1623, 2006 WL 3891516, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec. 22, 2006), mentioned in
George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 61 SMU L. REV. 1107, 1114 n.37.
127. Bilouiris, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 736-37.
128. Id. at 737.
129. Id. at 740.
130. Id.
131. See Sundance Res., Inc., No. ENG-06-CDO-1623, 2006 WL 3891516, at *1 (Tex. St.
Sec. Bd. Dec. 22, 2006).
132. See 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2006).
133. See 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006).
134. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
135. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 cmt. to 1977 Amendment (for seller
liability for registration violations, "§ 33A(1) . . . is similar to U.S. Securities Acts § 12(1)";
for seller liability for misstatements and omissions, "[c]hanges have been made ... [to]
§ 33A(2) . . . [to] bring this provision closer to . . . U.S. Securities Acts § 12(2)").
136. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-6(F) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (exemption for
securities traded on a recognized exchange).
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market to the federal system. The result is to impose requirements on
aiding and abetting liability more appropriate to the primary market than
to the secondary market.
A federal district court in In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative &
ERISA Litigation,137 ruled on a motion to dismiss investor lawsuits
brought under the TSA and the TSFA against an investment banker for
aiding and abetting Enron in defrauding the investors by helping to de-
vise and implement complex sham transactions that helped Enron hide
debt and overstate income. 138 The investors, primarily insurance compa-
nies and investment companies, had purchased Enron common stock,
bonds, and commercial paper from another investment banker in the sec-
ondary market, and retained these securities through Enron's collapse.1 39
The elements for aider and abetter liability under the TSA are: (1) a
violation by the primary perpetrator of one of the proscriptions against
selling without registering, seller misrepresentations and omissions, buyer
misrepresentations and omissions, or misrepresentations and omissions in
a non-selling issuer prospectus for selling shareholders; (2) a "general
awareness of the aider and abetter's" role in the violation;1 40 (3) "sub-
stantial assistance" by the aider and abetter in the violation; and (4) the
aider and abetter's intent to deceive the victim or reckless disregard of
the truth.1 4 ' The investors alleged that the primary perpetrator had vio-
lated the seller misrepresentation provision and the non-selling issuer
prospectus requirement.1 42 However, the seller misrepresentation provi-
sion requires privily between the perpetrator and the investors.' 43 Since
the investors had not purchased their Enron securities from Enron but
instead from an investment banker on the secondary market, they lacked
privity with Enron.144 Therefore, to succeed the investors needed to
plead that their immediate seller was an agent of Enron under the princi-
ples of Texas law.' 45 With respect to the non-selling issuer provision, the
district court concluded that a transaction exemption applied, foreclosing
liability against the primary perpetrator under the provision since the in-
137. 540 F. Supp. 2d 759 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
138. Id. at 763-74.
139. Id. at 763.
140. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(F)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2008); Sterling
Trust Co. v. Adderley, 168 S.W.3d 835,840-43 (Tex. 2005) (affirming the general awareness
element derived from federal securities law); see also Goldstein v. Mortenson, 113 S.W.3d
769, 776 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.).
141. In re Enron Corp., 540 F. Supp. 2d at 769-70.
142. Id. at 767.
143. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 cmt. to 1977 Amendment ("§ 33A(1)
[like §§ 33A(2) and 33B] is a privity provision, allowing a buyer to recover from his offeror
or seller [or a seller to recover from his offeror or buyer]. However, some nonprivity
defendants may be reached under §§ 33C and 33F" for nonselling issuers registering for
insiders selling and for aiding and abetting); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA
Litigation, 258 F. Supp. 2d 576, 601-08 (S.D. Tex. 2003).




vestors were all insurance companies and investment companies. 146 The
TSA's fraud provisions do not apply to sales to insurance companies and
investment companies, since, as sophisticated investors, they do not need
the protection of TSA.147 This transaction exemption, however, does not
apply to the seller misrepresentation and omission proscription since that
proscription specifically states that liability accrues regardless of any
transaction exemption.1 48 Consequently, the district court permitted the
investors to replead to correct for these shortcomings. 149
The TSFA aider and abetter provision imposes liability on those who
have awareness of the falsity made by the perpetrator, fail to disclose it to
the victim, and benefit from the false representation. 150 In In re Enron
Corporation Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation, the issue between
the investors and the aider and abetter was whether the TSFA imposed a
duty to disclose an omission on the aider and abetter when such language
was absent from the aider and abetter provision. Based on cases dealing
with the real estate element of statutory fraud, the district court deter-
mined that the TSFA does impose the affirmative duty to disclose an
omission on the aider and abetter in certain situations. 151 Consequently,
the district court permitted the investors to replead to correct for this
shortcoming.
B. COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACTS
Under the federal statutes, the Fifth Circuit considered a case of first
impression and determined that an issuer could not recover damages for
146. Id. at 798; see also id. at 763, 786 (identifying the plaintiffs as insurance companies
and investment companies).
147. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5H (Vernon Supp. 2008) (transaction ex-
emption for, among others, insurance companies and investment companies).
148. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33A(2) (Vernon Supp. 2008) ("[u]ntruth
or Omission. A person who offers or sells a security (whether or not the security or trans-
action is exempt under Section 5 or 6 of this Act)").
149. In re Enron, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 696-97.
150. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE. ANN. § 27.01(d) (Vernon 2008).
151. In re Enron, 540 F. Supp. 2d. at 793 n.42, 799. The statutory fraud cases for real
estate held that the statutory fraud provision is the same as for common law fraud, except
that the statute eases the scienter requirement from "knowingly or recklessly" to "induc-
ing" the victim to enter the contract of sale. See, e.g., Larsen v. Carlene Langford & As-
soc., Inc., 41 S.W.3d 245, 249 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet. denied); Diversified, Inc. v.
Walker, 702 S.W.2d 717, 723 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The
common law imposes a duty to disclose an omission in four situations: (1) where there is a
fiduciary relationship between the aider and abetter and the victim, (2) where the aider
and abetter voluntarily discloses some information but not all, (3) when new information
renders the aider's and abetter's prior representation misleading or untrue, and (4) where
the aider and abetter partially discloses to convey a false impression. See Hoggett v.
Brown, 971 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied). Therefore,
some Texas courts have imposed the same duty to disclose an omission under the TSFA
and the real estate portion of the statutory fraud provision. See 1994 Land Fund II-Dallas
1, L.P. v. Ramur, Inc., No. 05-98-00074-CV, 2001 WL 92696, at *6 (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb.
5, 2001, no pet.) (for TSFA); Swanson v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 895 S.W.2d 719, 732
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 959 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1997) (fraud
by nondisclosure for offshore mineral interests).
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violations of the Williams Act made by the acquirer. 152 The Fifth Circuit
also imposed a requirement of scienter before a Sarbanes-Oxley whistle-
blower could recover against the issuer for terminating the whistle-
blower's employment. 153 The Supreme Court, in order to determine the
difference between a perpetrator and an aider and abetter, rejected the
concept of scheme liability used by some federal courts but previously
rejected by the Fifth Circuit.154
1. Damages Denied Issuer for Reporting Disclosure Violations Under
Williams Act
The Fifth Circuit had the opportunity to join its sister circuits and af-
firm a matter under the Williams Act 155 for tender offers. The Williams
Act requires disclosure of the shareholder's intentions when the share-
holder's ownership exceeds five percent of the issuer's outstanding
shares.156 Courts have fashioned an implied action under the Williams
Act. The few circuit courts to have considered a case in which an issuer is
seeking damages, rather than an injunction, in a private action against a
shareholder for misrepresentation or omission under the Williams Act,
have uniformly denied damages.15 7 In Motient Corp. v. Dondero, a target
issuer complained of statements made in the acquirer's Schedule 13D fil-
ings, disparaging the management of the target issuer. 5 8 The issuer
claimed that the acquirer erroneously stated that the issuer's board had
not met to discuss and evaluate an exchange offer the acquirer wanted
derailed; failed to state the issuer's board had worked with independent
financial advisors to structure a consolidation opposed by the acquirer;
and accused the issuer's audit committee of failing to properly investigate
allegations brought by the acquirer of self-dealing, conflicts of interest,
fiduciary lapses, and excessive payments to the issuer's board. 59 The tar-
get issuer sought damages and an injunction to prevent the acquirer from
purchasing or selling shares of the target issuer, or soliciting votes of
152. Motient Corp. v. Dondero, 529 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2008).
153. Allen v. Admin. Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 479-80 (5th Cir. 2008).
154. Stonebridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 764-65 (2008).
155. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
156. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006).
157. In the Second Circuit, see Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P. v. Gotham Partners,
L.P., 286 F.3d 613, 620 (2d Cir. 2002). The Eleventh Circuit, in dicta, has determined that
no private cause of action for damages exists for the issuer under Exchange Act § 13(d).
Compare Florida Commercial Banks v. Culverhouse, 772 F.2d 1513, 1519 (11th Cir. 1985)
(issuer does have private cause of action for injunctive relief for corrective disclosure) with
Liberty Nat. Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter, 734 F.2d 545, 564-65 (11th Cir. 1984) (no private
cause of action for issuer, but issuer sought only injunctive relief for divesture, not dam-
ages). The Seventh Circuit upheld a district court's dismissal for an issuer that obtained
injunctive relief but sought additional damages under state law where the district court
regarded the state actions as an attempt to circumvent the Williams Act's restriction on
issuer recovery of damages. Champion Parts, Inc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 878 F.2d 1003,
1005 (7th Cir. 1989).
158. 529 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 2008).
159. Id. at 534.
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other shareholders of the issuer.160 The federal district court dismissed
with prejudice for failure to state a claim.16 ' The Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision on damages and remanded for dismissal with-
out prejudice on the injunction. 162 The Fifth Circuit noted the damage
remedy was an issue of first impression in the circuit. Congress passed
the Williams Act to protect investors in the target issuer from making
decisions on a tender offer without adequate information about the ac-
quirer's qualifications and intentions, and so that the investor will not
favor the target issuer's management or the acquirer in their contest for
control. 163 Sister circuits, in considering the matter, have also decided
against allowing the damage remedy. 164 The Exchange Act itself pro-
vides a remedy for damages suffered due to misstatements in Exchange
Act filings, subject to a defense that the perpetrator did not know the
statement was false or misleading. 165 With respect to the request for an
injunction, the Fifth Circuit noted that the acquirer's subsequent sale of
its stock in the target issuer mooted the question. 166 The Fifth Circuit
refused to issue an opinion on the validity of the injunctive relief other
than to note that, as mooted, the irreparable harm required for injunctive
relief was absent.' 67
2. Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Suit Denied in Absence of Scienter
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 provides that public companies may
not discharge or discriminate against employees reporting information
the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of certain laws,
including a criminal securities fraud statute and any rule or regulation of
the SEC.168 In Allen v. Administrative Review Board, the issuer, a funeral
home and cemetery company, terminated, among others, three employ-
ees in an issuer-wide reduction-in-force. 169 The three employees chal-
lenged their termination under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by filing with the
160. Id. at 532.
161. Id. at 535.
162. Id. at 536.
163. See, e.g., id.
164. See cases cited supra note 99.
165. See 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (2006).
166. Motient, 524 F.3d at 535-36.
167. See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 56 (1975) (equity's irreparable
harm requirement also applies to injunctive relief under Exchange Act § 13(d)).
168. See Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 806, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2008) ("[N]o [publicly-traded company] . . . may discharge,
demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an em-
ployee in the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the
employee (1) to provide information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist
in an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes consti-
tutes a violation of... [18 U.S.C.] section 1348 [securities fraud], any rule or regulation of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud
against shareholders, when the information or assistance is provided to or the investigation
is conducted by ... (C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee .. "); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2008) (criminal securities fraud).
169. 514 F.3d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 2008).
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Department of Labor, contending the issuer terminated them because
they had reported protected information. 170 They had reported to their
superiors errors in refund interest calculations for customers that prepaid
on their installment contracts, thereby overcharging those customers that
did not complain; delays in payment of the refunds to customers that
might lead to state law sanctions; and sending bills to customers showing
zero balances when the insurance companies had yet to make payment,
thereby hindering collections from customers shocked by subsequent bills
if the insurance companies did not pay. One employee, a certified public
accountant, had reported to a superior that internal accounting reports
overstated income by not following a SEC staff accounting bulletin
prohibiting public companies from recognizing sales revenues before de-
livering the merchandise, a past practice of the issuer. The administrative
law judge dismissed the action, which was affirmed by the Administrative
Review Board of the Department of Labor, because the employees had
not engaged in protected activities. 171 The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 172 The
Fifth Circuit used both a subjective and an objective standard to govern
the employees' "reasonable belief" concerning the issuer's alleged viola-
tions. 173 With respect to the interest calculation, delayed refunds, and
billing problems, the employees asserted protection based on violating
federal law against fraud on the shareholders. Citing opinions relating to
securities fraud under Rule lOb-5,174 the Fifth Circuit imposed a scienter
requirement on the issuer for violation of "federal law relating to fraud
against shareholders." 175 The court then found substantial evidence sup-
porting the administrative law judge's and Administrative Review
Board's findings that the employees did not "reasonably believe" the is-
suer intended to defraud its shareholders. 176 For the interest calculation,
the employees knew the issuer was working on a computer program to
correct the problem, performed manual calculations for all accounts, in-
cluded solving the matter as a goal, and sponsored a conference to ad-
dress the problem with field personnel. For the delayed refunds, the
employees knew the issuer had a significant backlog of refunds and was
attempting to remedy the problem. For the billing problems, the employ-
ees knew the customers were contractually obligated and that the issuer
used collection agencies to collect unpaid bills. With respect to the staff
accounting bulletin, the employee asserted a violation of an SEC regula-
tion. The Fifth Circuit found substantial evidence supporting the admin-
istrative law judge's and Administrative Review Board's findings that the
employee did not "reasonably believe" the issuer violated an SEC rule.177
170. Id. at 471.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 477.
174. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
175. Allen, 514 F.3d at 479-80.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 478-80.
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The staff accounting bulletin did not have the force of law and did not
apply to internal financial statements not reported to the SEC.178 The
Fifth Circuit noted that the staff accounting bulletin in question stated it
was not a rule of the SEC but was merely an "interpretation[ ] and prac-
tice[ ] followed by the Division of Corporation Finance and the Office of
the Chief Accountant in administering the disclosure requirements of the
Federal securities laws."1 79 Consequently, the staff accounting bulletin
only applied to financial statements filed with the SEC. Not only had the
employee testified that she knew that the staff accounting bulletin did not
apply to internal financial statements, but she had made no effort to ex-
amine the issuer's SEC filings to determine whether those statements
complied with the staff accounting bulletin. 180
3. Scheme Liability Unavailable for Aider and Abetter Liability
Under federal law, courts do not permit private actions for securities
fraud under Rule 10b-5 against aiders and abetters.18 ' Consequently,
many investors under federal law attempt to avoid the prescription by
alleging a primary violation of the federal securities laws by the aiders
and abetters. Since many aiders and abetters neither make public mis-
statements nor violate a duty to disclose,182 the problem becomes one of
determining the difference between a primary perpetrator and an aider
and abetter for employing an artifice to defraud or engaging in fraudulent
conduct. 183 For this determination, the lower federal courts have taken
two approaches. The first approach follows the past language of the Su-
preme Court' 84 and divides the Exchange Act's proscription against "ma-
nipulative or deceptive device[s] or contrivance[s]" 185 into two separate
offenses. Manipulative devices are limited to those in the securities mar-
ket that prevent the marketplace from accurately reflecting the securities'
value.186 Deceptive devices or contrivances are those involving misstate-
178. Id. at 478.
179. Id. at 478 n.5; Staff Accounting Bulletin 101, 1999 WL 1100908, at *1 (Dec. 3,
1999).
180. Id. at 479.
181. See Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 179-80.
182. Aiders and abettors thereby do not violate the misstatement or omission portion
of rule lOb-5(b) ("[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading"). 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
183. For the remaining portions of rule 10b-5, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 ("[tio employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud") & 10b-5(c) ("[t]o engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person").
184. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177
(1994) (stating "[a]s in earlier cases considering conduct prohibited by § 10(b), we again
conclude that the statute prohibits only the making of a material misstatement (or omis-
sion) or the commission of a manipulative act."); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 473 (1977) (holding that the "language of [§] 10(b) gives no indication that Congress
meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception.").
185. See 15 U.S.C. § 10(b) (2006).
186. See, e.g., Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1360 (N.D.
Tex. 1974) (issuers filing false SEC reports or issuing misleading press releases or insiders
trading on inside information alone is not manipulative); see also Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476
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ments and omissions. 187 Consequently, one with a duty to disclose, who
makes no misrepresentation or omission and who does not engage in ma-
nipulative securities price activities, cannot be liable under Rule 10b-5,
and, at worst, can only be an aider and abetter. 188 The second approach
follows the language of the SEC generally submitted in amicus briefs.
The SEC's scheme liability provides primary liability for "[a]ny person
who directly or indirectly engages in a manipulative or deceptive act as
part of a scheme to defraud.' '189 Aiders and abetters are those that assist
other participants in the scheme, but do not themselves participate in a
deceptive or manipulative act.190
The significance of this distinction for Texas lawyers is that the Fifth
Circuit followed the first approach, 19' while the Southern District of
Texas followed the second approach. 192 Moreover, Texas law allows pri-
vate actions against aiders and abetters under both the TSA and the
TSFA.193 Since the fraud provisions of the TSA are modeled on the fed-
eral statutes, 94 Texas courts interpreting TSA frequently look to the fed-
eral decisions. 95
The Supreme Court recently decided to end the split among the various
circuits over which approach to use for aiding and abetting under Rule
10b-5. In Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
(stating that "[t]he term [manipulation] refers generally to practices, such as wash sales,
matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially af-
fecting market activity.").
187. See, e.g., Hundahl, 465 F. Supp. at 1360 (1979) (issuers filing false SEC reports or
issuing misleading press releases, or insiders trading on inside information alone is not
manipulative); see also Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 474-75 (must be manipulative or deceptive and
situation without misrepresentation or omission is not deceptive).
188. See In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2006),
affd sub nom., Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008); accord
Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (auditor not liable under
rule 10b-5 for privately approving press release that contained unaudited financials, and no
mention of the audit firm, since it made no misrepresentation or omission [and act is not
manipulation]), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999); see also Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 235
(6th Cir. 2004) (scienter case: stating in dicta that the auditors not liable under Rule 10b-5,
for not insisting on revisions to unaudited financials since it made no misrepresentation or
omission [and act is not manipulation]); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215,
1225-27 (10th Cir. 1996) (reversed auditor's conviction on jury instruction that contained
aiding and abetting liability; in dicta stating that for accountant liability under Rule 10b-5,
"they must themselves make a false or misleading statement (or omission) that they know
or should know will reach potential investors").
189. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 439 F. Supp. 2d 692,
715 n.27 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
190. See id. at 722-23.
191. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d
372, 386-87 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1120 (2008). For a discussion of the case,
see George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 61 SMU LAW REV. 1107, 1126-28 (2008).
192. See In re Enron, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 715.
193. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F(2) (Vernon Supp. 2008); TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(d) (Vernon 2008).
194. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 cmt. to 1977 Amendment (Vernon
Supp. 2008).
195. See, e.g., Herman Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 563-64 (5th
Cir. 2002) (for TSA fraud provision, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33).
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Inc.,196 investors brought suit under Rule 10b-5 against suppliers of the
issuer for entering into contracts that allowed overcharging for the suppli-
ers' equipment, plus the suppliers' equal overpayments for the purchase
of advertising from the issuer.' 97 These two transactions, treated as a
wash as required by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP),
enabled the issuer to treat the advertising payment as income and capital-
ize the overpayment on the equipment purchase, contrary to GAAP. The
federal district court dismissed the action.198 The Eighth Circuit affirmed
on the ground that the petition, alleging scheme liability, failed to allege a
securities fraud claim against the suppliers as primary perpetrators since
they made no misstatement to the public, had no duty to disclose omis-
sions, and engaged in no manipulation.1 99 The Supreme Court affirmed,
but not on the distinction used in the circuit courts. Instead, the majority
concluded that the deceptive acts committed by the suppliers, but not
disclosed to the investing public, were "too remote to satisfy the require-
ment for reliance/[causation]" for a private action under Rule 10b-5. 200
The majority then supplied a number of policy reasons to shield these
aiding and abetting acts from liability.20 Congress, reacting to the Su-
preme Court's action eliminating aiding and abetting from Rule 10b-5
actions, only reinstituted it for the SEC.20 2 The majority feared that ex-
pansion of Rule 10b-5 liability to this sort of aiding and abetting would
increase the number of "weak claims to extort settlements from innocent
[issuers]" and would deter overseas firms from doing business in the
United States.203 Since the Rule 10b-5 action is a judicial construct, it is
up to Congress to expand it beyond what the Supreme Court had previ-
ously announced as the limits of the Exchange Act.20 4 There are SEC
actions and state actions against these acts of aiding and abetting.
These policy grounds did not convince the dissenters.20 5 The dissenting
opinion would apply the forseeability test of common law torts, imposing
liability on a person making a misrepresentation to a third person if he
has reason to expect the third person will communicate the misrepresen-
tation to the victim. 20 6 The investors had alleged the suppliers knew that
the perpetrator would use the deceptive acts to influence the market
196. 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (J. Kennedy).
197. Id. at 766-67.
198. Id. at 767.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 770.
201. Id. at 770-74.
202. Id. at 771; see Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164 (1994); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.; 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006).
203. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 772.
204. Id. at 772-73; see Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474-76 (1977) (act
must be manipulative or deceptive: affecting market activity, a misrepresentation, or an
omission).
205. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 777 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (J. Breyer to no part in the
decision of the case).
206. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 533 (1977).
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price of the issuer's stock. Herein lies the difference between the major-
ity and the dissent. The majority saw that the suppliers accounted for the
transactions correctly and thus, should be able to expect the perpetrators
to do the same.20 7 The dissent saw all issuers as immoral, and so the
suppliers should have known they would not account for the transaction
correctly. 20 8 Under the majority opinion, future market players need not
worry about their inability to predict future acts of perpetrators of securi-
ties fraud.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Texas federal courts have continued to narrow the application of
Texas securities laws. The Fifth Circuit applied the federal class action
preemption test of SLUSA after consolidation in federal court, but per-
mitted unconsolidated state actions to continue unpreempted. The Fifth
Circuit also determined that the stringent federal pleading rules apply to
state law actions in federal court. The Southern District of Texas nar-
rowed aider and abetter liability in the secondary market by imposing a
privity requirement for the primary perpetrator under the TSA and re-
quiring a duty to disclose by the aider and abetter under the TSFA.
Texas courts expanded the number of appellate jurisdictions accepting
the rule that jury members need not agree on the same misrepresentation
or omission to impose criminal liability for securities fraud and that a
defaulting issuer cannot void a contract in violation of the securities laws.
The Texas federal courts also narrowed the application of the federal
securities laws in Texas. The Fifth Circuit rejected a private cause of ac-
tion for issuer damages for reporting violations during a tender offer and
imposed a scienter requirement for terminated employees seeking dam-
ages under Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower lawsuits. The Supreme Court
narrowed the ability to impose primary liability on aiders and abetters by
rejecting scheme liability.
207. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 774.
208. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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